Analysis of Articles about Economic Growth Annotated Bibliography

Analysis of Articles about Economic Growth - Annotated Bibliography Example The author showed evidence to support his argument that the recent housing market boom bears many similarities to the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, and may eventually be followed by declining home prices for years to come. All this information helped me understand the real estate market more clearly; therefore, I can deeply analyze the internal connections in both markets. Solomon, S. (1995). The confidence game: How Unelected Central Bankers are governing the changing world economy. New York: Simon and Schuster. The author studied the interaction of the world’s financial markets by looking at the way Central Bankers in the U.S., Germany, Japan, England, and France coordinate their economic decisions, whether related to interest rates, exchange rates or target economic growth and inflation rates. The book showed how the world’s financial markets are connected and controlled by a small group of government officials and economists, which is frightening because people who are not elected are in control, but also somewhat reassuring because it also shows that different countries are helping each other to prevent the global financial crisis from happening. The discussion on the past bubbles, especially the 1987 Black Monday crash in the New York Stock Exchange, and how the market corrected to save itself from a major crisis, are very dramatic and a good learning experience. Tully, S. (2007, September 3). â€Å"Risk returns with a vengeance.† Fortune Magazine, 156 (4), 30-36. This is part of the same issue of Fortune Magazine on the market crash of 2007. This article is a discussion of the issue of risk, what it is, how it is measured, how banks and lenders try to avoid it, how borrowers regard it or not, and how overconfidence and greed result in the lowering of the perception of risk by the market. Although a bit cynical, since the author wrote that financial markets seem to go from one crisis to another, the article is also very enlightening because it shows how a free market economy makes adjustments that market forces learn to abuse.  

Types of materials (metals, ceramics, polymers,composites) Essay

Types of materials (metals, ceramics, polymers,composites) - Essay Example Hexagonal and cubic close packed are the most efficient ways with coordination number of 12. Metals have metallic bonding that occurs as a result of electromagnetic attraction between electrons and protons. The metallic bonds are strong and provide metals with great strength and localized atoms at solid state but have delocalized electrons. The electrons are usually delocalized with the ability to move that makes metals have good conductivity of heat and electricity (Reger, Goode, & Ball, 2010). The arrangement of these electrons in the metallic bonding is usually in an orderly manner. The numbers of delocalized electrons depend on the valence of specific metal element. The orderly arrangement of the atoms in metals provides the crystalline structure with many crystals bordering each other. The presence of the positive and negative forces in the metals also assists in the reactivity of metals with non-metals to form covalent bonds. These are materials made of inorganic molecules through heating of the powder or slurry that are commonly thermal and electrical insulators. The composition of ceramics may contain atoms of metalloid, nonmetal and metals. Ceramics are not metals, polymers nor semiconductors. At least one of the elements in ceramics must be nonmetallic. The application of heat to the powder fabricates it to form ceramics. Sometimes there is use of pressure and heat together in forming ceramics. Ceramics are mostly composition of two or more elements hence they are compounds in nature. Most of the ceramics are made of compounds containing nitride and oxides which are highly crystalline. Others may also contain borides, carbides and silicide from reaction with metals. Examples of ceramics include aluminum oxide, silicon nitride and magnesium oxide. Ceramics have a varied structure that range from simple to being very complex. Ceramics exhibit short range

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually

The Kate Moss Effect :: Beauty Media Modeling Self Esteem Essays

The Kate Moss Effect â€Å"Women, you know that crummy feeling you get after leafing through a fashion magazine chock full of models who, let’s face it, look way better than you? A new study, The Kate Moss Effect, suggests that it‘s not all in your head† (Jennifer Thomas, HealthScout). There have been so many times in my life, and I’m sure in other women’s lives as well, that I feel totally inadequate in comparison to, let’s say, a Victoria’s Secret Model. I just have one question: How is a woman ever supposed to feel good about herself when the only thing being consistently promoted is perfection? There have been many experiments done, in which doctors study the effects that the pressure to have a perfect body has on the average female. However, I am going to concentrate on the Kate Moss Effect for the simple reason, that of all the studies I looked at, The Kate Moss Effect seemed to be the most realistic, and straight forward. So let’s get back to that good old feeling of sifting through the many discouraging pages of a modern day fashion magazine. The Kate Moss Effect is a study based around the simple everyday activity of viewing a publication crammed with aptness. Basically, women were gathered to look at pages bubbling with models who were virtually flawless and their reactions to this exposure were then observed. To be exact, researchers divided 91 Caucasian women, ages 18 to 31into two groups. One group was shown advertisements for various everyday products such as nail polish, toothpaste, and gum. However, these ads featured rail thin females, the virtual living, breathing representation of faultlessness. The second group was shown ads for the same types of merchandise. Except the second group’s ads didn’t have people in them. â€Å"Researchers found that women who looked at advertisements featuring stereotypically thin and beautiful women showed more signs of depression and were more dissatisfied with their bodies after only one to three minutes of viewing the pictures. Depression levels registered a slight uptick, while self-esteem was unchanged† (Jennifer Thomas, Health Scout). Laurie Mintz, the lead author of the study and the associate professor of educational and counseling psychology at University of Missouri-Columbia said, â€Å"The women who registered the biggest drop in self image after viewing the

Dubai as Rentier State

United Arab Emirates Political Economy The success of the United Arab Emirates come directly from its high revenue made from oil exports. This country was a desert region that turned into an economic boom in the recent years. According to CNN World News, â€Å"Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates [is] the richest city in the world. The Emirate's citizens, who sit on one-tenth of the planet's oil and have almost $1 trillion invested abroad, are worth about $17 million apiece. Because of this factor, the UAE is considered one of the wealthiest countries in the world. However, turmoil struck the country with the recent global recession in 2008 that led to contradictions in their global oil wealth. Now that the country is recovering from this down point, the state infers global oil position will recover in sales on a slow but steady pace. In this research paper, I will demonstrate how the United Arab Emirates functions under a rentier economy and the country has not built the political stability they intended which led to challenges faced by the people and government.The rentier model of the United Arab Emirates depicts the stability of the political economy from its high oil revenues. A unique characteristic of the prosperity of the country stems from the fact of the discovery of oil. What oil production really means is a natural resource taken from the earth and not an existing good that is produced through sales. What distinguishes a rentier economy from other countries is the oil profits and its high dependence on one necessity for foreigners. A rentier is a group or entire state that profits on income from property or investments, and in such a case oil from the UAE.The rentier is not involved with the making of the incentive, but is entitled to a high amount of the money. In his journal, â€Å"The Rentier State in the Arab World,† Beblawi explains what a rentier economy is based upon. He claims, â€Å"There is no existence of a real ren tier state. Every rentier economy is an economic structure with the backings of external rent coming into the funds† (Beblawi). This rent is vital to the measurement of success in a rentier economy. This is the key factor in holding the economy together without a domestic sector. Also, a entier economy doesn't have many hands involved with the generation of the wealth. The creation of such wealth is maintained and kept within a small number of elites. The governance of the country is able to rely on the discovery of oil mines to external profit being it is a main factor in the county's high success rate. Previously, this money would have to come from the population, such as merchants and artisans, but now it can be received precociously from dependent revenue provided by the oil. The settlement between the social group and the workers create a social contract.About seventy to eighty percent of the lower to middle class, also known as the labor force, participates in the produc tion of oil in the United Arab Emirates. Whereas a large percentage is involved in the production, a small fraction of society partakes in the distribution, and benefits of the revenues. According to the Financial Times, â€Å"Due to the high volume of oil distribution and price increase, the early 1970's began an era of investments in industry, services, public works, and investments in infrastructure.Because of these investments, a high demand for a workforce grew which surpassed the demand of supply† (Chazan). This chain reaction led to a foreign workforce that would interfere with the national workforce. It became such a huge development that the foreign workforce evolved into the primary workforce in all sections of the economy. Developing the infrastructure system was one of the main fields where the Emirates sought improvement through other investments. Works such as roads, highways, airports, telecommunication networks, and governmental ministries were built.They revo lutionized the states from a barren into a highly developed country. The Arab monarchs then invested in another industry so they could ensure a long term source of income in a time where oil prices constantly changed. The last investment was an investment in social needs and services. These services included health care, educational improvement, and even housing facilities. The three areas of investment was designed for one purpose. That purpose is for a smoother more easy form of oil transportation, which would lead to a boom in the economy.The wealthy Arab monarchs spared no expense as they imported laborers from many countries. The countries in which they imported labor were India, Pakistan, Great Britain, Germany, and even the United States of America. Despite the heavy importation of laborers, it was only meant to be temporary, as the Monarchs believed the national population would serve as the workforce and take over where the foreign labor force left off. The Monarchs thought wrong as the national population were not too fond of taking manual labor jobs that were unpleasant or difficult.This created a problem of social structure within the Emirate people of the UAE. The population didn't want to take on these manual jobs after the federation set up a system of other high industry incomes. This led to influx of millions of foreign labors who remained in the country, which the government had no intention for tending to. A short term plan turned into a drawn out problem for the country. The astonishing detail of the United Arab Emirates is that they were able to create an oil revenue that provided the rulers with an upper hand.This country has built an entire welfare state in which it doesn't have to extrapolate tax from it's subjects. According to The New York Times, â€Å"Oil is the mainstay of the UAE economy and the driving force behind it. If there were to be a negative development in the country's financial situation or on the policy of the state, t he country will be faced with direct implementation due to these factions. † The oil prices have always been unsteady in the global market which has created a myriad amount of oil revenues. Certain common citizens are allowed to own their own portion of oil.But unfortunately, some of the oil revenues are given out in the federal government through high Emirate elites which hinders on the country's aptitude of generating their own in-housed wealth. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi earns the sanction of creating more than 90% of the total contribution to the oil market to secede in their country's fortune (CIA World Factbook). Dubai also contributes to this fund as well. The government structure of UAE, known as a federation system, do not procure ownership in the federal profits of oil so this makes the country highly susceptible to the dependence of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi.This ultimately makes the oil revenuers indirectly dependent. What toughens the situation for the country are the changing oil prices constantly that is not controlled by government or elite officials. State planning is hard to carry out under such circumstances. This is bound to stem from state profit being relied upon oil revenue that isn't promised for today and tomorrow's plans. This creates a setback from the people of the Emirates who cannot be supported by the federal budgets of such an economy thriving on the oil industry.There is an annual deficit of millions of dirhams (UAE currency) because of this fluctuation in oil prices. The focus of this essay has been to analyze how the United Arab Emirates try to obtain political firmness as a rentier state and not follow through with it successfully for the inhibitions of the people. The rentier theory points out that loyalty in politics is rooted in economic motivation. Economic welfare is meant to go hand in hand with political opposition. Yet, the economic welfare of the people are closely linked to oil revenue of the United Arab E mirates in the world market.The problem of foreign labor plays a part in the state's welfare policy as well. The importation of foreign labor was vital for the economic growth that started as a result of the oil price increase. The government thought that the national population would be able to give the needs to fill the workers’ place. This assumption turned out to be wrong. This essay has shown that the rulers’ welfare policies have made nationals skeptical in their choice of labor. In addition, this essay has depicted how the rentier model can exult the explanation of Abu Dhabi’s leading role within the federation.These facts have strengthened the assumption that the rulers use the oil economy as an instrument in securing stability but not to the country's best ability. Bibliography Beblawi, Hazem. â€Å"The Rentier State in the Arab World. † Politics of the Middle East (2009). Web. 5 May 2012. Chazan, Guy. â€Å"Oil: Finally Aligning Strategic Plans . † Financial Times. 16 Apr. 2012. Web. â€Å"Economy of UAE. † CIA World Factbook. 12 Apr. 2010. Web. Gared, Davidson. â€Å"Economy and Financing Projecting the UAE. † The New York Times. 16 Mar. 2011. Web. Gimbel, Barney. â€Å"The Richest City in the World. † CNN World News. 12 March 2007.

Constructing On Constructivism The Role Of Technology Education Essay

AbstractionA complementary relationship exists between engineering and constructivism, the execution of each one profiting the other. Constructivism is a philosophy saying that larning takes topographic point in contexts, while engineering refers to the designs and environments that engage scholars. Recent efforts to incorporate engineering in the schoolroom have been within the context of a constructivist model ( e.g. , Richards, 1998 ) . The intent of this paper is to analyze the interrelatedness between constructivism and engineering as revealed by empirical research. The instances include a assortment of surveies in a assortment of scenes – instructor instruction, on-line acquisition, and K-12 instruction ; constructivist schemes include collaborative and concerted acquisition methods, prosecuting in critical and brooding thought, rating through electronic portfolios, and a critical expression at emerging instructor functions within constructivist paradigms. Success has be en reported in the development of constructivist class faculties utilizing engineering as cognitive tools, profiting both pupils and module. However, many instructors do non utilize constructivist patterns, and those who do are non wise in their choice of engineering usage ( Rakes, Flowers, Casey, & A ; Santana, 1999 ) . Technology needs to be viewed in a 3-dimensional position: semiotic, epistemological, and matter-of-fact, enabling the â€Å" building of cognition † by scholars through a procedure of socialization.Introductionâ€Å" Once cognizing is no longer understood as the hunt for an iconic representation of ontological world, but, alternatively, as a hunt for suiting ways of behaving and thought, the traditional job disappears. Knowledge can now be seen as something that the being builds up in the effort to order the as such formless flow of experienceaˆÂ ¦ † von Glasersfeld ( 1984, p. 39 ) The usage of computing machine engineering to back up acquisition has been hard to document and quantify ( Clark, 1994 ; Russell, 1999 ) , go forthing the function of computing machines in the schoolroom unstable. In the past decennary, a sudden revival of involvement was markedly observed in the schoolroom usage of technological inventions, along with the increased usage of the Internet and other digital engineerings ( Reiser, 2002 ) . The field of Instructional Design and Technology, excessively, saw the development and outgrowth of alternate attacks, such as cognitive and constructivist theories, that deviated aggressively from traditional patterns, such as behavioural theoretical accounts. New accents, like electronic public presentation support systems, web-based direction, and knowledge direction systems, non merely agitate the cognition base of the field, but besides widened its skyline across concern and industry, the military, wellness attention and instruction, worldwide ( Reiser, 2002 ) . Enterprises, such as located larning theory and constructivism presented fresh attacks to convey about reforms in the spheres of public instruction and higher instruction ( Anderson, Reder & A ; Simon, 1996 ; Brown, Collins & A ; Duguid, 1989 ; Jonassen, 1999 ; Reiser, 2002 ) . To understand the potency of engineering execution in heightening the teaching-learning procedure, the impact of constructivism on schoolroom patterns has been studied by many research workers ( e.g. , Black & A ; McClintock, 1995 ; Richards, 1998 ; Brush & A ; Saye, 2000 ) . Other research workers have suggested that constructivist schemes exploit engineerings for greatest impact in larning ( e.g. , Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ) . A complementary relationship appears to be between computing machine engineerings and constructivism, the execution of each one profiting the other. Constructivism, derived chiefly from the plants of Piaget ( 1970 ) , Bruner ( 1962, 1979 ) , Vygotsky ( 1962, 1978 ) , and Papert ( 1980, 1983 ) , is both a philosophical and psychological attack based on societal cognitivism that assumes that individuals, behaviours and environments interact in mutual manner ( Schunk, 2000 ) . Constructivism is a philosophy saying that larning takes topographic point in contexts, and that scholars form or construct much of what they learn and understand as a map of their experiences in state of affairs ( Schunk, 2000 ) . More late, research workers ( e.g. , Lave, 1990 ; Saxe, Guberman & A ; Gearheart, 1987 ) have presented more qualitative certification of larning in context. Technology, harmonizing to Jonassen, Peck, and Wilson ( 1999 ) refers to â€Å" the designs and environments that engage scholars † ( p. 12 ) . The focal point of both constructivism and engineering are so on the creative activity of larning environments. Likewise, Hannfin and Hill ( 2002 ) depict these larning environments as contexts: in which knowledge-building tools ( affordances ) and the agencies to make and pull strings artefacts of understanding are provided, non one in which constructs are explicitly taughtaˆÂ ¦ a topographic point where scholars work together and back up each other as they use a assortment of tools and larning resources in their chase of larning ends and problem-solving activities ( p.77 ) . The intent of this paper is to reexamine the research on the integrating of engineering in the schoolroom, foregrounding the connexion between constructivism and engineering. The focal point is on the constructivist position of larning as an active procedure of building instead than geting cognition, and direction as a procedure that supports building instead than pass oning cognition. The reappraisal is followed by a series of instance surveies, stressing constructivism and engineering ‘s relationship. Finally, deductions for instructors and instructor pedagogues are presented.Review of Related LiteratureIn order to understand larning within a constructivist model, as an activity in context, the whole acquisition environment must be examined. However, the broad diverseness of constructivist positions makes the task really complex and beyond the range of this paper. These positions normally emphasize the function of the instructor, the pupil, and the cultural embeddedness of ac quisition ( see for example, Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ; Honebein, Duffy, & A ; Fishman, 1993 ; Simons, 1993 ) . Using these commonalties as guidelines, this reappraisal outlines the relationship of constructivism with engineering by looking at ( a ) engineering as cognitive tools, ( B ) constructive position of the thought procedure, and ( degree Celsius ) the function of the instructor in engineering enhanced environments. Technology as Cognitive Tools A cardinal premise of constructivism is that larning is mediated by tools and marks ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ; Ezell & A ; O'Keeffe, 1994 ) . â€Å" Culture creates the tool, but the tool changes the civilization. Participants in the civilization appropriate these tools from their civilization to run into their ends, and thereby transform their engagement in the civilization † ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996, p. 180 ) . The computing machine is an example of mediational agencies that has facets of both tool and mark. The computing machine ‘s function in instruction has been mostly viewed as an instructional tool and for supplying a richer and more exciting acquisition environment ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ; Jonassen & A ; Reeves, 1996 ; Taylor, 1980 ) . However, by concentrating on the scholar, the function of engineering can back up new apprehensions and capablenesss, therefore, offering a cognitive tool to back up cognitive and metacognitive procedures. For i llustration, an electronic exchange plan between pupils of a category in the U.S. with a similar schoolroom in Northern Ireland shared multiple cultural positions through images, narratives, letters and multimedia plans ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ) . The experience was enriching, increasing their apprehension. Further, clear uping the function of engineering in acquisition, Duffy and Cunningham ( 1996 ) province: Technology is seen as an built-in portion of the cognitive activityaˆÂ ¦.This position of distributed knowledge significantly impacts how we think of the function of engineering in instruction and preparation, the focal point is non on the person in isolation and what he or she knows, but on the activity in the environment. It is the activity – focused and contextualized- that is cardinal†¦ The procedure of building is directed towards making a universe that makes sense to us, that is equal for our mundane operation ( pp. 187-188 ) . Therefore, the undertaking of the scholar is seen as dynamic, and the computing machine makes available new larning chances. The position of engineering as cognitive tools is besides shared by other research workers ( e.g. , Jonassen, 1994 ; Jonassen & A ; Reeves, 1996 ; Lajoie, 2000 ) . The traditional position of instructional engineerings of direction as conveyers of information and communicators of cognition is supplanted with active function the scholar plays in larning with engineering. Technologies, chiefly computing machines, help construct cognition bases, which will â€Å" prosecute the scholars more and ensue in more meaningful and movable knowledgeaˆÂ ¦ Learners map as interior decorators utilizing the engineering as tools for analysing the universe, accessing information, interpretation and forming their personal cognition, and stand foring what they know to others † ( Jonassen, 1994, p. 2 ) . Technological tools such as spreadsheets, databases, adept systems, picture conferencing and others can be used by pupils to analyse capable affair, develop representative mental theoretical accounts, and so transcribe them into cognition bases ( Jonassen, 1994 ; Jonassen & A ; Carr, 2000 ; Jonassen & A ; Reeves, 1996 ) . An illustration is the development of fake microworlds and games by kids utilizing Logo scheduling. Logo scheduling has evolved since the early text-based medium conceived by Seymour Papert and his squad at MIT in the 1970 ‘s, to a well easy, digitized format. Kafai, Ching, and Marshall ( 1997 ) gave an introductory preparation plan to fifth and sixth grade pupils one hebdomad before the design undertakings. The Logo version included support for modern computing machine characteristics like multimedia, sprite life, sounds, films, and pigment tools. Harmonizing to Kafai and her co-workers ( 1997 ) , the multimedia package proved to be a good context for pupils to larn through coaction and undertaking direction. The interaction between squad members, the flow of thoughts and loud thought encouraged the kids to experiment and happen alternate ways for planing and work outing jobs. For illustration, the pupils worked on different characters separately, but so worked together to inc orporate all the characters, and in debugging ( Kafai et al. , 1997 ) . Cognitive tools do non prevent the usage of computing machines to increase productiveness for larning. Off-loading insistent undertakings and lower order undertakings to cognitive tools frees cognitive resources for deeper thought ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ; Jonassen, 1999 ) and reduces mistakes. Harmonizing to Swain and Pearson ( 2001 ) , instructors and pupils must be educated to utilize the computing machine as a productiveness tool, every bit good as a tool for acquisition, research, networking, coaction, telecommunications, and problem-solving. Using computing machines as a productiveness tool is one of the six National Educational Technological Standards ( NETS ) ( hypertext transfer protocol: //cnets.iste.org/ ) for instructors which states that instructors will â€Å" utilize engineering to heighten their productiveness and professional patterns † ( Morrison, Lowther, & A ; DeMeulle, 1999 ) . Constructive position of â€Å" Thinking † The procedure of thought in constructivist paradigms requires higher-order accomplishments, diging deeper and harder into content and context ( Black & A ; McClintock, 1995 ; Jonassen, n.d. ; Manzo, 1998 ; Swain & A ; Pearson, 2001 ) . Traditional schooling, harmonizing to Manzo ( 1998 ) , really discourages constructive believing with ends of conveying bing cognition that conflicts with any existent effort to bring forth new apprehension. â€Å" Constructivist thought combines both the critical and originative rational procedures. It can be practiced by promoting critical analysis in activities. Schools, instructors and pupils can be conditioned to swerve away from traditional schooling regimen to promote constructive thought † ( Manzo, 1998, p. 287 ) . Cognitive tools, along with constructivist larning environments, usher and activate cognitive acquisition schemes and critical thought ( Jonassen, 1994 ) . Cognitive tools help in cognition building and non knowledge reproduct ion. The cognition constructed by the scholars reflects their comprehension and construct of the information. To exemplify, when pupils build cognition bases with databases, they need to analyse the content sphere and engage in critical thought. Black and McClintok ( 1999 ) emphasis the importance of reading as being cardinal to knowledge and acquisition. Their design of Study Supported Environments ( SSEs ) based on constructivist design rules called Interpretation Construction Design ( ICON ) focused chiefly on the interpretative building of reliable artefacts in the context of rich background stuffs, and crossing across different Fieldss of survey. Their survey showed that in add-on to larning specific content, pupils were able to get generalizable reading and debate accomplishments. For illustration, in learning 6th grade antediluvian history, a plan called Archaeotype A © was used that presented pupils with a in writing simulation of an archeological site. Students who worked collaboratively in groups, had to delve up artefacts through simulation, observe and mensurate them in fake research labs, and eventually through a procedure of reading and debate, arrived at the apprehension of general rules behind what they were making. In a follow-up rating survey, it was found that there were important additions in the interpretive and debate accomplishments of pupils who had participated in the survey against a control group ( Black & A ; McClintock, 1999 ) . Brooding thought, that requires careful deliberation, is besides encouraged by constructivists ( e.g. , Kafai et al. , 1997 ; Swain & A ; Pearson, 2001 ; Walker, 2000 ) . Metacognition, or the self-monitoring and self-denial of the acquisition procedure, is emphasized. New cognition which is composed is added to old representations, modifying them in the procedure. This normally requires external staging in the signifier of people, books, or engineerings such as computing machines. Swain and Pearson ( 2001 ) recommend the pattern of brooding thought by instructors to measure their engineering usage. They stress the importance of certification of brooding ideas to find the extent and quality of personal versus instructional utilizations of engineering, organisation and execution of environments and activities. Jonassen ( 1994 ) describes technological tools as â€Å" rational spouses † and â€Å" powerful accelerators † in the procedure of acquisition, â€Å" scaffoldin g the all important procedures of articulation and contemplation, which are the foundations of cognition building † ( p. 5 ) . The Role of the Teacher in Technology Enhanced Environments The function of the instructor as a facilitator is seen as most of import in a constructivist context ( Witfelt, 2000 ; Richards, 1998 ) . Within a constructivist schoolroom, the instructor engenders societal and rational climes, where collaborative and concerted acquisition methods are supported. In parallel, technology-enhanced schoolrooms tap constructivist schemes ( Jonassen, 1999 ) , set uping problem-based undertakings where pupils actively construct cognition, associating knew cognition with old cognition. In non-traditional schoolrooms such as the open/global schoolroom ( Walker, 2000 ; Witfelt, 2000 ) , the function and duties of the instructor have changed. The instructor, as an agent, has to invariably update information and engineering for doing learning reliable and relevant. For illustration, while developing a class faculty for instructors and taxonomy for instructor competences in the usage of educational multimedia, Witfelt ( 2000 ) observed that it was of import to unite several theories such as constructivism, postmodernism, situated intelligence and multiple intelligences. However, the theoretical model would be constructivist in nature with the instructor presuming the function of the facilitator, supplying an environment for self-generated research, understanding the societal and collaborative nature of acquisition, assisting kids concept cognition and initiate problem-based, project-oriented work. With this passage in functions and duties, Witfelt ( 2000 ) listed new in structor competences in constructivist contexts that include supervisor makings, protagonist and facilitator of pupils ‘ work, adviser and subject-matter expert, galvanizer and encourager, supreme authority at group treatments, critic in mobilising greater attempt when aims are non being met, and judge to better general larning capacities of pupils.Case StudiesAfter analyzing the literature on engineering integrating and constructivist rules, a complementary relationship between engineering and acquisition within a constructivist model seems sound and advantageous to instructors and scholars. To exemplify these rules discretely, model instances are presented that reflect the doctrine established above. Teacher-trainees at Winthrop University in South Carolina undertook a meaningful technology-based activity to carry through literacy ends ( Richards, 1998 ) . They developed an electronic portfolio around a literacy-related subject, including informations, contemplations and critical responses, which they shared with their equals and other pedagogues. The extract of engineering was helped by implementing constructivist-based activities, such as coaction and cooperation in a group, prosecuting in job resolution and building possible solutions to social quandary, and pass oning the deeper processing of content and the critical development of literacy accomplishments and schemes ( Richards, 1998 ) . Student perceptual experiences were determined through formative and summational appraisal methods. Students responded positively toward achievement of concerted and collaborative acquisition, the engineering constituent maps and the relevancy of the activities to future callings in schools. However, they recommended that more clip be provided for treating thoughts and synthesising them in the portfolio. Research conducted at the Open University, U.K. besides demonstrated a positive relationship between constructivism and engineering integrating ( Walker, 2000 ) . A distance-learning class was developed maintaining in head the experiential and constructivist positions of larning. The intent was to assist pupils in a distance-learning class learn in better and more effectual ways, to be active scholars, building their ain apprehension. Assignments and appraisals were besides oriented towards constructivist ends. Their attempts culminated in a new paradigm of class development. A study of all the pupils who completed the class and took the scrutiny revealed that the bulk felt that they had improved their acquisition accomplishments to a considerable extent. A follow-up study was undertaken the undermentioned twelvemonth. These findings revealed a high proportion of positive responses to inquiries sing the continued usage of contemplation to better assignments, based on teachers ‘ feedback and rating standards. However, pupils were less positive about their usage of contemplation in general. These pupils like those described above ( Richards, 1998 ) struggled with maintaining and utilizing contemplation efficaciously. Students were non the lone donees of the mixture of constructivist schemes with engineering tools. Harmonizing to Richards ( 1998 ) and Walker ( 2000 ) , the development of class faculties based on constructivist patterns and the integrating of engineering were besides good to the module, as they had to be after and revise to incorporate engineering so that pupils could be helped to go more capable and mature scholars.Deductions for PracticeThese instances have important deductions for instructor pedagogues and instructors. In the country of instructor instruction, Kim and Sharp ( 2000 ) observed that the planning of instructors consistent with constructivist patterns was extremely variable with most preservice instructors cognizing really small about the effectual integrating of engineering in instruction. Since instructors tend to learn as they were taught, it is indispensable that both preservice and inservice instructors must be exposed to constructivist-based direction, which wo uld so ease the development of learning schemes consistent with recent reform motions ( Kim & A ; Sharp, 2000 ) . An exposure to constructivist learning methods and coincident multimedia acquisition experiences influenced the planning of constructivist behaviours and extract of engineering ( Kim & A ; Sharp, 2000 ) . Technology may besides act upon teacher pattern to integrate constructivist rules. Rakes, Flowers, Casey and Santana ( 1999 ) study that as the sum of engineering available, the degree of engineering accomplishments of the instructors, and the usage of engineering increased, the usage of constructivist schemes in the schoolroom besides appeared to increase. â€Å" Technology can supply the vehicle for carry throughing constructivist instruction patterns † ( Rakes et al. , 1999, p. 3 ) . So, increasing the accomplishment degrees of instructors with respect to computing machines and supplying extra chances for instructors to incorporate engineering into lessons may promote the usage of constructivist behaviours. Availability, skill degree and usage may non, nevertheless, warrant purposeful usage of engineering nor constructivist rules. Rakes et Al. ( 1999 ) reported many instructors concentrated on the drill and pattern type of package, pretermiting basic computing machine accomplishments development, or dealt merely with presentation accomplishments and Internet resources. These research workers recommended concentrating on staff development and preparation in engineering usage and constructivist patterns that moved beyond literacy accomplishments to turn to more thoroughly application and curriculum integrating issues. When turn toing the function of the instructor in constructivist paradigms, there should be no misconstruing sing the importance of the instructor. Yet, many instructors feel uncomfortable with the deficiency of a chiseled content and the displacement of venue of control to the scholars ( Brush & A ; Saye, 2000 ; Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ) . Making suited contexts is non simply supplying scholars with resources and allowing them discover things for themselves, but forming resources in such a manner to breed cognitive disagreements in the heads of the scholars, animating them to larn how to larn through a procedure of coaction and defendable apprehensions ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ) . As a facilitator of acquisition, the instructor is non ineffective and on the out of boundss. On the contrary, the instructor is free to utilize a assortment of constructivist schemes, such as coaching, mold, and scaffolding, to help each scholar ( Collins, Brown & A ; Newman, 1990 ) . Scaffolding may include support from other persons and artefacts, every bit good as the cultural context and history that the scholars bring to the environment. Scaffolding, nevertheless, does non intend guiding and learning a scholar toward some chiseled end but back uping the growing of the scholar through cognitive and metacognitive activities ( Hannafin, Hill & A ; Land, 1997 ) . Therefore, the instructor assumes the function of a manager and ensures common apprehension of the positions of the scholar. In utilizing collaborative and concerted groups, the instructor must be careful in guaranting that they are non merely schemes for acquisition, but means to advance dialogical interchange and reflexi veness ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ) . As Morrison, Lowther, and DeMeulle ( 1999 ) competently suggest, â€Å" Technology and a constructivist attack need non be at odds with each other. If we change our position of computing machines from simply a agencies to present direction to one of a tool to work out jobs, so the reform motion can act upon the usage of engineering, and engineering can act upon the reform of instruction † ( p. 5 ) .DecisionConstructivist positions assert that acquisition is the active procedure of building instead than passively geting cognition, and direction is the procedure of back uping the cognition constructed by the scholars instead than the mere communicating of cognition ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ; Honebein, Duffy & A ; Fishman, 1993 ; Jonassen, 1999 ; ) . Truth is determined by the viability of the scholars ‘ apprehension in the existent universe, where viability is culturally determined. The constructivist model seeks to understand multiple positions, and challenges the s cholars ‘ thought ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ; Jonassen, Mayes & A ; McAleese, 1993 ) . It examines the societal beginnings of buildings, whereby it acknowledges larning as a procedure of socialization. Therefore, the survey of societal and cultural procedures and artefacts becomes a cardinal issue. Context is a dynamic whole including the person and sociohistorical facets ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ; Ezell & A ; O'Keefe, 1994 ) . Thinking is ever dialogic, linking heads, either straight or indirectly. The indirect or semiotic agencies are the marks and tools appropriated from the sociocultural context ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ) . Within this displacement in focal point from the objectivist to the constructivist context sphere, engineering can play an built-in portion in the acquisition environment ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996 ) . â€Å" The profusion of the engineering permits us to supply a richer and more exciting ( entertaining ) larning environmentaˆÂ ¦ our concern is the new apprehensions and new capablenesss that are possible through the usage of engineering † ( Duffy & A ; Cunningham, 1996, p. 187 ) . By incorporating engineering with constructivist methods, such as problem-based acquisition and project-based acquisition, scholars are more responsible for and active in the acquisition procedure ( Grant, 2002 ) . Additionally, mundane applications, such as word processors and spreadsheets, become powerful instruments for reliable acquisition. Constructivism offers flexibleness to instructors to individualise larning for each pupil while utilizing engineering tools to augment cognitive and metacognitive procedures.SubscribersAloka Nanjappa is presently a doctorial campaigner, Instructional Design and Technology, Department of Instructional Curriculum and Leadership, University of Memphis, Tennessee. She was Assistant Professor in a college of instruction, affiliated to the University of Bombay, India, learning Experimental Psychology, Educational Technology, and Methodology of learning Mathematicss. She has besides taught in the K-10 and undergraduate degree ( Zoology ) in India. Aloka was late awarded the Outstanding ID & A ; T Graduate Student Award by the University of Memphis, Tennessee. Her research involvements lie in teacher instruction with a focal point on engineering integrating in the schoolroom. Michael M. Grant is an Assistant Professor at the University of Memphis in the Instructional Design and Technology plan within the teacher instruction section. His most recent research has focused on suiting single differences and constructionism. He has worked with both preservice and inservice instructors on incorporating engineering.